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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 3, 2010, the plaintiff-appellant, Monica Gross formerly known as Monica Gamer 
("Monica" hereafter), filed for divorce from the defendant-respondent, Chris Garner ("Chris" 
hereafter). On June 28, 2010, Chris filed his answer and counterclaim. Monica was represented by 
Mr. Stan Welsh of the firm Cosho Humphrey. Chris was represented by Mr. Kelly Whiting. The 
parties were both represented by their respective counsel throughout the divorce proceeding, 
including the signing of the Stipulation for Entry of Judgment which was filed on October 26, 
2010. 
On October 26, 2010, a Judgment was entered pursuant to the stipulation divorcing Monica and 
Chris. Two children were born of the marriage, namely B.G. born o and K.G. born 
o
On September 9, 2010, the parties entered into a Parenting Plan which is attached to the judgment 
which includes a custody schedule agreed to by the parties. The custody schedule provides as 
follows: 
School Schedule: The children will reside with Mother and spend every other 
weekend with Father from Friday after school until Monday to school and each 
Wednesday from after school until Thursday to school, if there is not school on 
Thursday the exchange is at 7:30 a.m. at Mother's.residence. If there is not school 
on Friday the exchange time is at 3:45 p.m. at Mother's residence. If there is not 
school on Monday the exchange time is at 11 :00 a.m. at Mother's residence. 
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Summer Schedule: Summer will be divided equally from the first Friday school is 
out until seven days before school resumes. Each parent will rotate having the 
children every two weeks. Mother will commence the rotation. Mother and Father 
will exchange the children every other Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
Under the custody schedule, Chris' percentage of overnights in a year was approximately 40%. 
The Judgment modified the custody schedule in the Parenting Plan and provides as follows: 
2. PARENTING PLAN: Attached hereto, and by reference incorporated 
herein, is a Parenting Plan. The parties shall comply with all terms of the Parenting 
Plan with the following changes: 
2.01 Under School Schedule, Christopher's weekend shall end on 
Sunday at 7:00 p.m. instead of Monday morning and the Wednesday visit 
shall end Wednesday evening at 8:30 p.m. 
Thus, the custody provision in the Judgment modified the custody provision in the Parenting Plan 
by taking away from Chris three overnight periods of custody every two weeks-i.e. the 
Wednesday overnight period every week and the Sunday overnight period every other week. The 
custody provision in the Judgment reduced Chris' percentage of overnights in a year to 
approximately 22%. 
On October 26, 2010, an Affidavit Verifying Income was filed, which set the pmiies' child supp01i 
guideline annual income at $47,142.00 for Chris and $54,677.00 for Monica. 
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Under the custody schedule in the Parenting Plan where Chris had approximately 40% of the 
overnights in a year, Chris' child support obligation should have been set at a total of $147.00 per 
month according to the Idaho Child Support Guidelines ("Guidelines" hereafter). The $147.00 
support total does not account for the tax dependency exemptions for the two children. 
Under the custody schedule in the Judgment where Chris had approximately 22% of the overnights 
in a year, Chris' child supp01i obligation should have been set at a total of $720.08 per month 
according to the Guidelines. Again, the $720.08 supp01i total does not account for the tax 
dependency exemptions for the two children. 
The child supp01i provision in the Judgment provides, in part, as follows: 
4. CHILD SUPPORT: Commencing November 1, 2010, and on the first day 
of each month thereafter, Christopher shall pay to Monica child support in the 
amount of $50.00 per month until reaches the age of eighteen (18). 
The Judgment provides no description of how the $50.00 child support was calculated. The 
Judgment does not state why there was a deviation from the child support amount of $720.08 under 
the Guidelines. 
Despite the child support obligation of $720.08 per month that should have been set according to 
the Guidelines under the custody schedule in the Judgment, Chris' child support obligation was 
set at a total of $25.00 per month per child. Since the entry of the Judgment on October 26, 2010, 
Chris has saved $670.08 per month which he should have paid under the Guidelines. 
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It was not a simple matter of oversight or miscalculation that led to the drastically deficient amount 
of child support in the Judgment. If that were so, Monica could have simply filed a motion under 
I.R.C.P. 60(a) to correct a clerical mistake or under I.R.C.P. 60(b) for mistake or inadve1ience. 
Monica willingly admits that the child support deficiency was part of an agreement that was made 
between Monica and Chris. Essentially, Monica agreed to a reduced amount of child support in 
order to obtain an increased amount of custody of the children. The parties' agreement is reflected 
by the provision in the Judgment which modifies the custody schedule in the Parenting Plan and 
the provision in the Judgment setting child support at a grossly inadequate level of $25.00 per 
month per child. 
The Parenting Plan also provided as follows: 
• Chris and Monica would both pay $600.00 per year for school clothes for the children; 
• Chris and Monica will contribute $30.00 per month for school lunches for the children; 
• In even years Monica will purchase school supplies in odd years Chris will purchase school 
supplies; and 
• Other school costs such as class fees, yearbooks, and activity cards will be split equally 
between Monica and Chris. 
On November 7, 2012, Monica filed the Plaintiffs Motion in the Form of a Complaint to Modify 
the Judgment. Monica sought to modify the child support order to reflect the actual custody 
schedule in the Judgment rather than the custody schedule listed in the Parenting Plan and also to 
reflect the current incomes of the parties. 
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On November 20, 2012, Chris filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Motion in the Form of a 
Complaint to Modify the Judgment (Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings) ("motion to dismiss" 
hereafter), which argued that there had been no substantial and material change in circumstances 
since the entry of the Judgment on October 26, 2010. 
On January 23, 2013, Monica filed the Plaintiff's Motion/Objection to Deny Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Motion in the Form of a Complaint to Modify Judgment. Monica argued 
that her modification action should be allowed to proceed on several grounds. 
The first ground was, as explained above, that the child support fixed in the judgment in the amount 
of $25.00 per month per child was grossly disproportionate to the child support that should have 
been awarded under the Guidelines in the amount of $720.08 per month. In support of the first 
grounds of her modification, Monica argued that rules contained within the Guidelines were not 
followed in setting the original child support amount. Moreover, Monica cited Sections 1-5 of the 
Guidelines in her objection to Chris' motion to dismiss arguing that the Guidelines provide the 
substantial and material change in circumstances. 
The second ground argued by Monica was that equity must intervene to modify child support 
orders not in conformity with the Guidelines. The trial court sits as both a court oflaw and a court 
of equity. Monica argued that equity must intervene to modify the grossly inadequate child support 
order entered in this case. 
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The third ground for Monica's modification action was that there had been a substantial and 
material change of circumstances supporting a modification of child support because Chris' yearly 
gross income had increased by $3,462.00 since the entry of the Judgment on October 26,2010. By 
adding Chris' additional income, Chris' current child support should be $761.50 before accounting 
for the tax exemptions. 
On February 26, 2013, Chris' motion to dismiss came on for hearing and the trial judge ruled as 
follows: 
Ms. Garner has filed an action asking the Court to modify this based on child 
support calculations and demonstrating as a bootstrap argument that the application 
of all of the standards with these income numbers would show that the child support 
is adequately - or an inadequate number. It's grossly inadequate. 
And Mr. Eismann points to the child support rules as grounds for modification but 
he's missing the point. He's missing the same point that Mr. Gamer missed in the 
last action and that is there is no material change in circumstance. 
And so in this instance without meeting the threshold, I'm granting the motion of 
the defendant. The matter is dismissed. I found it was brought without any 
basis. This record is clear. The income was there to begin with and, you know, I 
suppose had a different legal tact been made at the time that Mr. Garner filed his 
action, the whole matter could be addressed. I'd suggest if either one of you like 
the positions you're in, you might want to consider mediation. 
Hrg. Transcr. 9: 9-15 & 10: 12-20 (Feb. 26, 2013) (emphasis added). 
On March 1, 2013, Chris filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and a Memorandum of Costs and 
Affidavit of Anne Marie Kelso requesting $1,012.50 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-
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121 and I.R.C.P. 54. On March 15, 2013, Monica filed the Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Costs 
and the Affidavit of Plaintiff re: Objection to Memorandum of Costs. The grounds of Monica's 
motion were as follows: 
~ Monica did not file and pursue her modification action frivolously, unnecessarily or 
without foundation; 
® The trial court did not analyze Section 5 of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines; and 
• The trial comi did not use its equitable powers to change a "grossly inadequate" child 
support provision of the judgment. 
The issue of attorney's fees was submitted to the trial judge without a hearing. On May 15, 2013, 
the Order Granting Attorney's Fees was entered, which states "Based upon the oral findings of the 
court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees is hereby 
GRANTED in the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWELVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS 
($1012.50)." Thus, Chris was awarded the full amount of attorney's fees requested by him. 
On March 29, 2013, Monica appealed the trial judge's decision to the District Court. On December 
30, 2013, the parties presented oral argument to the District Court Judge Duff McKee on Monica's 
appeal. On January 15, 2014, District Judge McKee's Memorandum Decision was filed, which 
affirmed the trial court's decision to grant Chris' motion to dismiss. District Judge McKee 
specifically found at pages seven through eight of his Memorandum Decision as follows: 
I conclude that the court below did not err in dismissing plaintiffs motion to modify 
child support because no material change in circumstances had been shown. 
The established child support was fixed by agreement of the parties, with the 
assistance of counsel, and was approved and incorporated into the judgment and 
decree that was entered in this matter in November of2012(sic) [October 26, 2010]. 
There was no challenge to the child support level at the time the stipulation was 
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offered, no motion or action for relief from the decree after its entry, and no appeal 
from the decree. 
The well-established law in Idaho is that while the court does have continuing 
jurisdiction over the matter of child support, once support is fixed by final decree 
of a court it is subject to modification only upon a showing of permanent and 
substantial change in circumstances. 
Thus, District Judge McKee agreed with the trial judge in holding that a substantial and material 
change of circumstances had not occurred, which thereby required dismissal of Monica's 
modification action. In District Judge McKee's Memorandum Decision, he awarded attorney's 
fees to Chris pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 on the appeal to the District Court. District Judge 
McKee remanded to the magistrate court the issue of the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. 
On January 24, 2014, Chris filed a memorandum of costs. On February 4, 2014, Monica filed her 
objection to Chris' memorandum of costs. In Monica's objection, she argued that certain charges 
were unnecessary, that certain charges were not separately identified by date, and that certain costs 
were discretionary. On February 24, 2014, a hearing was held on Chris' memorandum of costs and 
the court awarded attorney's fees to Chris. 
On June 13, 2014, the Order Granting Attorney's Fees was filed. Monica appeals from this award 
of attorney's fees in addition to other issues presented herein. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district judge err in affirming the decision of the magistrate court to dismiss a 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF PAGE IO 
motion to modify a child support provision of a judgment of divorce which was entered pursuant 
to the agreement of both parents but which fails to comply with the Guidelines when there is a 
substantial difference between the child support agreed to by the parents and the child support 
calculated by applying the Guidelines? 
2. Did the district judge err in affirming that the trial court acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion in entering an order dismissing Monica's petition to modify child support on the grounds 
that the parties agreed to the judgment of divorce fixing a child support amount that could not be 
modified because there was no material and substantial change in circumstances? 
3. Did the district judge e1T in affirming the magistrate court's decision when both the 
magistrate court and the district judge did not consider the claim for equitable relief to modify a 
child support amount fixed by the judgment of divorce so that the child support complies with the 
Guidelines? 
4. Did the district judge err if affirming the trial court's decision when the trial court failed to 
consider the meaning of Section 5 of the Guidelines and whether such section can supply the 
material and substantial change of circumstances when it provides, in part, as follows: "The 
amount of child support provided for under these Guidelines may constitute a substantial and 
material change of circumstances for granting a motion for modification of child support 
obligations."? 
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5. Did the district judge err in his interpretation of Section 5 of the Guidelines. 
6. Does Chris's increase in annual income from $47,142.00 when the judgment of divorce 
was entered on October 26,2010, to $50,604.00 when Monica's complaint to modify child support 
was filed (an increase of $3,462.00 or 7%), standing alone or coupled with the fact that the child 
support fixed by the judgment of divorce is substantially lower than the child support would have 
been if the Idaho Child Support Guidelines had been applied or coupled with any other fact or facts 
in this case constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances? 
7. Is the child support calculated under the Guidelines for the benefit of the children? 
8. Do parents enter into an enforceable contract if they both approve a judgment of divorce 
providing an amount of child support which is substantially less that the amount of child support 
which would be calculated by applying the Idaho Child Support Guidelines? 
9. Did the district judge err in affirming the trial court's award of attorney's fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-121? 
10. Did the district judge err in awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 on 
the appeal to the district court? 
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ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Monica is not requesting attorney's fees on appeal. As explained below, Monica is appealing from 
the attorney's fees that have been awarded to Chris by the magistrate court and the district court. 
Monica's appeal of the attorney's fees awards is based on three basic grounds. The first ground is 
that this is a new area of law that has not been addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. The second 
ground is that Monica believes that Section 5 of the Guidelines allows for a modification of child 
support in her case. The third ground is that even if current law supports Chris' position, Monica 
asks for a good faith modification or extension of existing law. For these reasons, Monica does not 
request attorney's fees on appeal. The opposition of Chris on this appeal could not be termed to 
be frivolous. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of review on appeal from District Court. 
In State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274,277,311 P.3d 286 (2013), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained the standard of review on appeal from the district comi sitting in its 
appellate capacity as follows: 
In an appeal from a judgment of the district court acting in its appellate capacity 
over a case appealed to it from the magistrate court, we review the judgment of the 
district court. In re Estate of McKee, 153 Idaho 432,436,283 P.3d 749, 753 (2012). 
We exercise free review over the issues of law decided by the district court to 
determine whether it correctly stated and applied the applicable law. Kennedy v. 
Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442, 259 P.3d 586, 588 (2011). With respect to the 
magistrate court's findings of fact that are challenged in the district court, we review 
the district court's decision as to whether those findings were supp01ied by 
substantial and competent evidence. Id 
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This case essentially comes down to the issue of whether the standard for modifying child suppo1i, 
requiring a substantial and material change in circumstances, is the only standard to modify child 
support given the distinct circumstances involved in this case. Clu·is, the trial court and the district 
judge have all stated that Monica's motion to modify child support must be dismissed because 
Monica has failed to prove a substantial and material change of circumstances. Monica argues that 
child support must be modified in this case to correct a "grossly inadequate" child support award 
that is in violation of Idaho public policy. Monica cites and argues several theories of how child 
support could be modified as were explained in the appeal to the district court and in this appeal 
as explained in detail below. 
2. Agreements between parents exchanging child support for custodial time regularly 
occur and are in violation of the clear public policy that parents must support their children. 
Before getting into the legal arguments of Monica's case, it is helpful to understand the problem 
presented herein and the frequency with which this problem is encountered in the trial courts. 
Setting a child support amount is a common problem in all cases wherein child support is an issue. 
Child support becomes even more problematic when child custody is also at issue because child 
custody directly affects child support. 
It is common knowledge that child custody and child support have been used by parties as 
bargaining tools. In our office, we have witnessed this bargaining since 1950. A common scenario 
is where one parent is somewhat disinterested in a majority of time with that parent's children. 
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However, once that parent realizes that child support will be higher because the other parent has 
the majority of time with the children, the parent makes a disingenuous effort to get more time 
with the children. Now the bargaining begins with one parent using custody and the other parent 
using child support. A compromise is often made whereby the parents agree to a child custody 
schedule and also agree a child support amount that is not based on the Guidelines. 
This case is perhaps one of the most extreme examples of such bargaining as is shown by the 
differences between the Parenting Plan of September 8, 2010 and the Judgment that was entered 
on October 26, 2010. Monica agreed to give up all but a small fraction of the child support she 
was due under the Guidelines in exchange for raising her custodial time with the children from 
60% of the overnights to 78% of the overnights in a year. Chris agreed to give up 18% of his 
overnight custodial time with the children in order to obtain a "grossly inadequate" child support 
figure of $25.00 per month per child. 
Lawyers for the parties also play a part in this bargaining. Whether the bargaining actually occurs 
through the lawyers, or through the parties, or through a mediator for the parties, the lawyers 
ultimately end up with the agreement that must be put into a judgment. The lawyers often prepare 
a written stipulation or put the agreement on the record in order to get a judgment entered. The 
lawyers have a duty to follow Idaho law pe1iaining to all issues including child suppo1i. 
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As explained at length below, the Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706(5) require that when there 
is going to be a deviation from the amount of support recommended under the Guidelines, there 
must be a record made of the reasons for deviating from the amount of child support recommended 
by the Guidelines. Lawyers regularly fail to create such a record in writing or by verbal stipulation 
on the record and thereby fail to follow Idaho law. 
The trial courts are the last line of defense to prevent the disregard of Idaho law found in the 
Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706(5). However, trial courts regularly enter judgments that 
deviate from the amount of child support recommended by the Guidelines without creating a 
record of the reasons for deviating. 
The trial courts are under pressure from the parties and the parties' lawyers to approve the 
agreement exchanging custody for child suppo1i. If the trial courts refused to approve agreements 
exchanging custody for child support, it is likely that many more cases would head to trial which 
in turn creates a heavier case load for the trial courts. Thus, when faced with an agreement 
exchanging custody for child support, the trial courts faces both external pressure from the parties 
and lawyers and faces internal pressure to avoid a heavier case load with additional trials. 
The duty of the trial court to make a record of the reasons for deviating from the Guidelines is not 
a difficult burden. However, the trial court is placed in a precarious position when creating such a 
record. Idaho Code § 32-717 and the suppmiing case law establish a duty upon the trial court to 
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do what is in the best interest of the children. If a trial court were to create a record of the parties' 
agreement to exchange custody for child support, such a record would conclusively show that the 
trial court has not fulfilled its duty to do what is in the best interests of the children. It cannot be 
argued that it is best for the children to live primarily with one parent that bears the majority of the 
financial burden of raising the children without significant financial help from the other parent in 
the form of child support. 
The public policy of Idaho is that children are best off when both parents are contributing 
financially to the children. This public policy is reflected in Sections 4(a) and 4(d) of the 
Guidelines as follows: 
(a) Both parents share legal responsibility for supporting their child. That legal 
responsibility should be divided in proportion to their Guidelines Income, whether 
they be separated, divorced, remmTied, or never married. 
( d) Rarely should the child supp01i obligation be set at zero .... There shall be 
a rebuttable presumption that a minimum amount of supp01i is at least $50.00 per 
month per child. 
Thus, the trial court cannot place an agreement on the record to eliminate one parent's obligation 
of child support without disclosing a violation of public policy. 
Child supp01i and child custody cases are often complicated, emotional, hotly contested, and 
expensive. Unfortunately, parties, lawyers, and trial courts regularly take the course of least 
resistance by making and enforcing agreements exchanging custody for child support without 
creating a record as to why the Guidelines were not followed. It is the dirty little secret of family 
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law cases that nobody wants to acknowledge or discuss. But this is a prevalent problem that must 
be corrected by Idaho's appellate courts because the best interests of the children are at stake. This 
issue is not about what is best for the parties, the lawyers, or the trial court. This issue is about 
what is best for the children involved both in this case and in future cases. Child custody must not 
be allowed to essentially be sold to gain a lower child support figure. 
Idaho's Legislature enacted to solve this problem by enacting Idaho Code § 32-706(5) which 
requires a record to be made when a child support amount deviates from the amount of child 
support recommended by the Guidelines. The Idaho Supreme Court has acted to solve this problem 
by incorporating the language of Idaho Code § 32-706(5) into Section 3 of the Guidelines. 
However, the trial courts and lawyers have not followed the rules laid out in Idaho Code § 32-
706(5) and the Guidelines. Thus, Idaho's appellate courts must address and correct this problem 
through case law. 
3. Without allowing Monica to modify child support, Monica has no reasonable 
alternative to correcting the grossly inadequate child support. 
If this appeal is not successful, Monica and her children are stuck with the grossly inadequate child 
support amount of $25.00 per child per month until there is a substantial and material change in 
income. There are only two scenarios where Monica can modify child support and neither of them 
are a reasonable solution to her problem. The first scenario, which was suggested by the trial court, 
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is to go to mediation with Chris. The second scenario is to wait for a substantial and material 
change in circumstances. Each scenario is discussed below. 
Under the first scenario, if Monica were to attempt to go to mediation to resolve the issue of child 
support with Chris, Monica would be completely at the mercy of Chris. Monica has no bargaining 
power and Chris has all of the bargaining power. Chris has strenuously fought all of Monica's 
attempts to modify child support. Thus, we can infer that Chris would be unwilling to increase his 
child support above $25.00 per child per month. 
Given that Chris has thus far been unwilling to increase his child support obligation, Chris' motive 
in mediation would likely be to keep his child support at or below the cmTent level. Since each 
party's percentage of custody directly affects the amount of child support, Chris could just demand 
enough custody time to keep his child suppo1i at or below the current level. Such a custody 
schedule would be close to an equal split of custody. 
In mediation, Monica would have only two options. The first option would be to reject Chris' 
demand and to continue receiving only $25.00 per child per month. The second option would be 
to accept Chris' offer and thereby reduce Monica's custodial time with her children. Thus, 
Monica's options are to either remain in her current situation or to give up time with her children. 
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The second scenario is for Monica to wait until there is a change in circumstances to modify child 
supp01i. This likely means that Monica would have to wait until Chris' income rises to a level that 
is considered a substantial and material change in circumstances. However, now that Chris is on 
notice that a substantial and material change in his income could allow a modification of child 
support, Chris will likely avoid any increases in his income. 
From Chris' perspective, any potential raise in income would have to outweigh the cost of the 
increase in his child suppo1i. If the proposed raise in income did not outweigh the increase in child 
support, then Chris would likely reject the raise in income. 
Chris currently pays $50 per month in child support. Chris' child support should be set at 
approximately $761 at his current income level. Consequently, Chris saves $711 per month in 
child support for a total yearly savings of$8,532. Assuming there are 40 hours in a work week and 
52 weeks in a year, there are a total of 2080 work hours in a year. Dividing Chris' total savings in 
child support of $8,532 by the number of work hours in a year results in $4.10 per hour. Thus, 
unless Chris received a pay raise of $4.10 per hour or more, Chris would lose money. 
Moreover, the above calculations do not account for taxes. Chris' theoretical pay raise would be 
taxed. Chris would likely need a raise of well over $5.00 per hour to make any potential pay raise 
worth it financially'. 
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The point in the above hypothetical situations is to show the situation that Monica faced prior to 
this modification action and the situation she faces if this modification action is ultimately 
dismissed. Monica has no reasonable option to co1Tect her situation. Monica either continues to 
incur the brunt of the financial responsibility or she gives up custodial time with her children. 
Those are her only options if the trial court's decision to dismiss her motion to modify is affirmed. 
4. The Guidelines provide the solution to the problem of deviations from the Guidelines 
in setting child support. 
As has been argued at all levels of this case, Section 5 of the Guidelines provides the path to correct 
the grossly inadequate child support in this case. Section 5 of the Guidelines provides as follows: 
Section 5. Modifications. The amount of child supp01i provided for under these 
Guidelines may constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for 
granting a motion for modification for child support obligations. A support order 
may also be modified to provide for health insurance not provided in the supp01i 
order. 
Chris, the trial court, and district judge have all either ignored or misinterpreted Section 5 of the 
Guidelines as requiring a substantial and material change of circumstances in order to modify child 
support. However, a plain reading of the first sentence in Section 5 shows otherwise. 
The first sentence in Section 5 is structured so that the amount of child support can provide or 
constitute the substantial and material change of circumstances which can then justify a 
modification. To say it another way, the sentence is a conditional sentence with three parts. 
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The first part of the sentence is the first condition that must be satisfied-i.e. "the amount of child 
support provided for under these Guidelines." If a party proves a change in the amount of child 
support, then that condition is satisfied. 
The second part of the sentence is a second condition giving the trial comi some discretion-i.e. 
"may constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances." Thus, if a party proves a 
change in the amount of child supp01i to satisfy the first condition, then the trial court has discretion 
to decide whether the amount of the change is substantial and material. The trial court must have 
discretion because not all changes in the amount of child support would be substantial and material. 
A change in the amount of child support of $5.00 per month is likely not substantial and material. 
However, a change in the amount of child support of $500.00 per month is likely substantial and 
material. The second condition provides the trial court with discretion as to what amount is a 
substantial and material change and what is not. 
The third part of the sentence is the result if the first two conditions are satisfied-i.e. "for granting 
a motion for modification for child support obligations." Thus, if a trial court finds that the amount 
of child support has changed and if the court finds that the amount of such change is substantial 
and material, then child support shall be modified to comply with the Guidelines. 
Chris, the trial court, and the district judge would interpret the sentence in a way that is directly 
contrary to the language used in the sentence. Chris, the trial court, and the district judge apparently 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF PAGE 22 
believe that there must be a substantial and material change in circumstances from the time that 
the last child support order was entered to the time the motion to modify is filed. However, Section 
5 of the Guidelines makes no mention of the circumstances of the paiiies at the time of the last 
child support order as compared to the circumstances of the parties at the time of filing the motion 
to modify. Section 5 of the Guidelines refers to the "amount of child support provided for under 
these Guidelines." The only reasonable interpretation of that phrase is that a trial court must look 
at the amount of child support currently ordered and compare that amount to the amount of child 
support that should be provided under the Guidelines. 
The trial court failed to address the issue of the applicability of Section 5 of the Guidelines and 
instead relied solely on the standard of a substantial and material change of circumstances to 
modify child support. However, the district judge addressed Section 5 of the Guidelines as follows: 
Plaintiff relies upon Section 5 of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines, I.R.C.P. 
6( c )(6), which provides that "the amount of child support provided for under these 
Guidelines may constitute a substantial and material change of circumstances for 
granting a motion for modification for child support obligations" ( emphasis added). 
I think the only consistent way to read this provision is that the adoption of the rule 
could be a "change in circumstance" if the amount of support under the rule differed 
from an existing level of child support. Further if the guidelines as a whole are 
amended up or down, the event of such amendment might constitute a change 
supporting modification. 
The district judge cites no authority for his interpretation of Section 5. The absence of authority is 
likely because there is no authority by an Idaho appellate court on the interpretation of Section 5 
of the Guidelines. This issue is an issue of first impression before Idaho's appellate courts. 
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Since there is no authority governing the interpretation of Section 5, statutory construction and 
public policy should be used to interpret Section 5. As stated above, the clear public policy of 
Idaho is that parents have a duty to provide financial support to their children. Given that public 
policy, Section 5 of the Guidelines should be interpreted to allow for a modification of child 
support when the amount of the existing child support order is substantially and materially 
different from the amount of child support calculated under the Guidelines. 
Moreover, the district judge's decision renders Section 5 nearly obsolete. The district judge 
interprets Section 5 of the Guidelines as providing a route for pre-Guideline child support orders 
to be modified after the adoption of the Guidelines. The Guidelines were originally adopted and 
became effective on July 1, 1993, which is over twenty years ago. Child supp01i usually ceases 
when a child turns eighteen years of age. Thus, there are no child suppo1i orders in effect from 
prior to the adoption of the Guidelines because any child involved in a pre-Guidelines child support 
order is now above the age of eighteen. 
Under the district judge's interpretation of Section 5 of the Guidelines, Section 5 is no longer 
relevant. However, Section 5 remains a part of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and it should 
not be disregarded. Section 5 must have some continuing meaning if it remains in effect. Monica 
argues that the meaning of Section 5 is to allow a modification of child support when the amount 
of child support currently ordered differs from the amount of child support stated in the Guidelines. 
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In this case, the Guidelines allow for a modification of child support based on a change in the 
amount of child support that Chris should pay. Chris's current child suppmi is set at a total of 
$25.00 per month per child. At the time of divorce, the child support should have been set at 
$720.08 per month. In Monica's motion to modify child support, Monica alleged that Chris' 
annual gross income had increased by $3,462 from the time the judgment was entered on October 
26, 2010, to a total annual gross income of $50,604.00. When accounting for Chris' additional 
income, Chris' current child support obligation should now be $761.50 per month (without 
accounting for the dependency exemption). 
Chris' current child support obligation is $50.00 per month. Using Chris' current income, his child 
support obligation should be $761.50 (again, this does not account for the dependency exemption). 
Therefore, Chris is saving $711.50 per month in child support by not paying under the Guidelines 
($761.50 - $50.00 = $711.50). Since the amount of child support provided for by the Guidelines is 
currently $711.50 greater than what Chris is currently paying, there is obviously a change in the 
amount of child support which may satisfy the condition of a substantial and material change in 
circumstances for a modification. 
The trial court specifically found that Chris' child support obligation was "grossly inadequate" on 
February 26, 2013. However, the trial judge incorrectly tied the modification of child support to 
a change in the circumstances of the parties' income rather than a change in the amount of child 
support. Therefore, the trial court abused his discretion and district judge's decision to affirm the 
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trial comi' s ruling was error. This case should be remanded with instructions to modify the child 
support in accordance with the Guidelines. 
5. Child support is for the benefit of the children and cannot be waived by the parents. 
By trumpeting the standard that there must be a substantial and material change of circumstances 
in order to modify child support, Chris, the trial comi and the district judge fail to realize who is 
harmed by the lack of child support, and that is Monica and Chris' children. Chris, the trial court 
and the district judge all want to enforce an agreement that never should have been made, that 
never should have been accepted by the trial judge handling the parties' divorce, and that is void 
as against public policy as to child support to be paid in the future. 
California courts have recognized that child support is for the benefit of the children and that right 
cannot be abrogated by an agreement of the parents incorporated into a judgment. In the case of In 
re Marriage of Alter, 171 Cal.App.4th 718, 722, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 849 (2009), a mother and father 
entered into a marital settlement agreement which stated that child support was to be "absolutely 
non-modifiable downward." The marital settlement agreement was incorporated into a judgment. 
In Alter, the court stated that parents cannot divest the court of its duty to set child support nor can 
the parents divest their children of the right to support as explained as follows: 
The Family Code allows parents to make an agreement pertaining to child support; 
but such an agreement is always "subject to approval of the court."(§ 4065, subd. 
(a).) This is not a question of first impression. Our Supreme Court explained over 
30 years ago: "When a child support agreement is incorporated in a child support 
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order, the obligation created is deemed court-imposed rather than contractual, and 
the order is subsequently modifiable despite the agreement's language to the 
contrary." (Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 947, 126 Cal.Rptr. 805, 
544 P.2d 941.) More recently, this court has emphasized: "It is true that parties may 
settle their disputes over child support by agreement. This state has a 'strong 
policy favoring settlement of litigation' over family law disputes. [Citation.] ... 
But such agreements, to the extent that they purport to restrict the court's 
jurisdiction over child support, are void as against public policy. [Citations.] 
Children have the 'right to have the court hear and determine all matters 
rthatl concern their welfare and they cannot be deprived of this right by any 
agreement of their parents.' [Citation.] Thus, these agreements are not binding 
on the children or the court, and the court retains jurisdiction to set child 
support irrespective of the parents' agreement." ( In re Marriage of 
Bereznak (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1068-1069, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 
351 (Bereznak).) 
( emphasis added) 
Several points can be drawn from the quotation above in Alter as follows: 
• Settlement of litigation over family law disputes is favored by strong public policy; 
• However, settlement agreements attempting to restrict a court's power to modify child 
supp01i are in violation of public policy and are thereby void; 
• Children have an absolute right to have the court determine issues concerning their welfare; 
• Agreements between parents attempting to prevent a modification of child support are not 
binding on the children or the court. 
The factual pattern in this case is very similar to that in Alter. In both cases, the parties entered 
into a contractual agreement prior to divorce. In both cases, the parties' agreement was 
incorporated in a judgment. In both cases, a party is attempting to enforce the terms of the judgment 
to prevent a modification of child support. In Alter, the judgment specifically stated that child 
support was "absolutely non-modifiable downward." In this case, there is no language in the 
judgment attempting to restrict the modification of child support, which is even more favorable to 
Monica's position to modify child support. 
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The maxims announced in Alter and set forth in the bullet points above should also be applied in 
this case. Chris must not be allowed to use the judgment as a shield to prevent the modification of 
child supp01i because it is in violation of public policy and is void. The children in this case have 
an absolute right to have a court determine the child suppo1i issue which concerns their welfare. 
This case should be remanded with instructions to modify child support in accordance with the 
Guidelines. 
In Kost v. Kost, 757 A.2d 952, 954 (2000), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected an 
argument similar to that made by Chris in this case regarding a change in circumstances and 
explained as follows: 
ii 4 On appeal Father contends the mother failed to show a change of 
circumstances justifying support, and questions whether mother is entitled to seek 
support when she promised not to and when she did not immediately seek review 
of the order approving of their agreement. 
ii 5 In support of his argument Father cites to Koller v. Koller, 333 Pa.Super. 54, 
481 A.2d 1218, 1220 (1984) which provides: 
[W]hen the agreement adequately provides for the needs of the children and 
spouse and has been recently entered into under court approval, unless a 
change of circumstances can be shown, there is no justification for ignoring 
the agreement. 
Father refers to this passage to demonstrate that an increase in support was not 
waITanted because Mother failed to demonstrate a change of circumstances. 
However, Father ignores the introductory language which prefaces by referring to 
an agreement which "adequately provides for the needs of the children." Id. In this 
case the guideline ranges recommended a support amount for Son which was 75% 
more than Father was currently paying under the agreement. Where the amount 
agreed upon differs from the guideline range so significantly, it must be presumed 
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that the agreement entered by the parties does not provide fair and just support for 
the child. In such a situation Father should bear the burden of establishing that the 
figure suggested by the guideline is not necessary for the child's support. The trial 
comi conectly noted that neither paiiy may bargain away a minor's child's right to 
adequate support. Miesen v. Frank, 361 Pa.Super. 204, 522 A.2d 85 (1987). The 
courts will see to it that a child receives adequate support and will not waiver from 
that duty simply because Mother agreed to a certain amount and also agreed not to 
seek an increase in that amount. The trial court was fully justified in considering 
Mother's request for an increase and we perceive no abuse of discretion in setting 
the amount of support at the guideline range. 
As explained in Kost, child support cannot be bargained away by a parent. If the parents make a 
bargain that does not adequately provide for the needs of the children and such child support differs 
significantly from the amount of child support suggested by the child support guidelines, then child 
supp01i should be modified even where there is no change of circumstances. 
6. There is a conflict of law between Idaho Code § 32-709 and Idaho Code § 32-706 that 
must be resolved in favor of the best interests of the children. 
Chris, the trial court and Judge McKee have all argued that child support cannot be modified unless 
there is a substantial and material change of circumstances since the parties' Judgment on October 
26, 2010. Their position is supported by the Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-709 which provides 
that the "provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to 
installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a 
substantial and material change of circumstances." The problem with their position is that it fails 
to recognize or consider the effect of when a child support order is entered contrary to existing law 
and guidelines. 
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There is no denying that the Judgment that was entered in this case on October 26, 2010, did not 
comply with the requirements of the Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706. The Judgment deviated 
from the Guidelines and awarded $25.00 per child per month in child support when then child 
supp01i should have been set at $720.08. Both the Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706 provide a 
specific procedure when there is a deviation from the amount of support to be awarded under the 
Guidelines. 
Section 3 of the Guidelines provides as follows: 
Section 3. Function of Guidelines. The Guidelines are premised upon the 
following general assumptions: (a) the costs of rearing a child are reasonably 
related to family income, and the proportion of family income allocated to child 
support remains relatively constant in relation to total household expenditures at all 
income levels; (b) in relation to gross income, there is a gradual decline in that 
propo1iion as income increases; ( c) the Guidelines amount is the appropriate 
average amount of support during the minority of the child at a given parental 
income, so that age-specific expenses do not alter the Guidelines amount. These 
assumptions may not be accurate in all cases. The amount resulting from the 
application of the Guidelines, which includes the basic child support 
calculation and all adjustments, is the amount of child support to be awarded 
unless evidence establishes that amount to be inappropriate. In such case the 
court shall set forth on the record the dollar amount of support that the 
Guidelines would require and set forth the circumstances justifying departure 
from the Guidelines; and ( d) child support received and the custodial parent's share 
of support are spent on the child(ren). 
( emphasis added) 
Idaho Code § 32-706(5) provides as follows: 
The legislature hereby authorizes and encourages the supreme court of the state of 
Idaho to adopt and to periodically review for modification guidelines that utilize 
and implement the factors set forth in subsections (1) through (4) of this section to 
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create a uniform procedure for reaching fair and adequate child support awards. 
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which 
would result from the application the guidelines is the amount of child 
support to be awarded, unless evidence is presented a particular case which 
indicates that an application the guidelines would be unjust or 
inappropriate. If the court determines that circumstances exist to permit a 
departure from the guidelines, the judge making the determination shall make 
a written or specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines 
would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case before the court. When 
adopting guidelines, the supreme court shall provide that in a proceeding to modify 
an existing award, children of the party requesting the modification who are born 
or adopted after the entry of the existing order shall not be considered. 
( emphasis added) 
The procedure set out in the Guidelines and in Idaho Code§ 32-706(5) was not followed in this 
case. Chris, the trial court, and the district judge would argue that Idaho Code § 32-709 (requiring 
a substantial and material change of circumstances) controls regardless of whether Idaho Code§ 
32-706(5) was followed, which requires a record to be made when there is a deviation from the 
Guidelines child support amount. Thus, the issue is what is the effect of a child support order that 
is entered in violation of the Guidelines and Idaho Code§ 32-706(5)? 
Monica proposes that when the child support order is entered in violation of Section 3 of the 
Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706(5), that the standard requiring a substantial and material 
change of circumstances is not required by Section 5 of the Guidelines. 
7. The Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706(5) are not discretionary. 
Monica has argued throughout this case that the Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706(5) were not 
followed. Chris and the trial court failed to address the issue of the Judgment being entered in 
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violation of the Guidelines and Idaho Code § 32-706(5). The district judge stated in his 
memorandum decision that the "guidelines are just that-guidelines. They may be modified or 
used differently depending upon circumstances." [insert citation- page 9 of memorandum]. It is 
error to assume that an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure such as I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6) - Child Support 
Guidelines is only a suggestion or discretionary. 
I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6) is a procedural rule which cannot be disregarded simply because the word 
"guidelines" is used in the name of the civil rule. The Guidelines were adopted as an Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure by the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-706(5), which 
provides, in part, as follows: 
The legislature hereby authorizes and encourages the supreme court of the state of 
Idaho to adopt and to periodically review for modification guidelines that utilize 
and implement the factors set forth in subsections (1) through (4) of this section to 
create a uniform procedure for reaching fair and adequate child support awards. 
Thus, the Idaho Supreme Comi has authority from the Idaho legislature to adopt the Guidelines. 
Nowhere in the I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6) does it state that the Guidelines can be wholly ignored by the trial 
comi. However, both the trial court that handled the parties' divorce case and the trial court that 
dismissed Monica's motion to modify child support ignored the rules provided in the I.R.C.P. 
6( c )(6) as explained throughout this brief. On appeal, the district judge ratified such conduct by 
dismissing I.R.C.P. 6( c )(6) as only a guideline. By doing so, the district judge committed reversible 
error. 
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8. The district judge committed error in affirming the court's decision to dismiss 
Monica's motion to modify child support. 
The district judge also explains that Monica's motion to modify was improper because Monica 
should have sought other legal remedies. The district judge's memorandum decision provides as 
follows: 
A motion to modify child support should not be a substitute for a timely objection 
or challenge to the support issue in the trial court before the entry of judgment, or 
to a timely challenge to the judgment itself under I.R.C.P. 60 or its equivalents, or 
to a timely appeal from the judgment. 
(Memorandum Decision at 8-9). 
Thus, the district judge provides three possible solutions to the problem that Monica faces and 
only one of those solutions is still available to Monica. 
A timely objection obviously cannot be made before the entry of judgment in this case since 
judgment was entered on October 26, 2010. Additionally, a timely appeal cannot be had because 
the time to appeal the judgment has long since expired. The last solution offered by the district 
judge is a motion under I.R.C.P. 60. 
Monica's motion to modify child support was brought under I.R.C.P. 60, specifically 60(c). At 
pages one and six of Monica's motion to modify, she cites I.R.C.P. 60(c) in support of the motion. 
In addition, Monica cites I.R.C.P. 60(c) at pages eight through nine of her objection to Chris' 
motion to dismiss. Thus, Monica did exactly what the district judge said she should do, yet the 
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district judge affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss Monica's motion to modify child 
support. By doing so, the district judge committed reversible error. 
9. This case appears to be a matter of first impression in Idaho and other states. 
This case presents a very unusual fact pattern with little to no similar case law. In this case, the 
parties entered into an agreement on child support that substantially deviated from the Guidelines. 
Since the judgment was entered, there has not been a substantial and material change of 
circumstances other than Chris' income increasing by $3,462.00 per year. The trial court and the 
district court on appeal found that Chris increase in income was not a substantial and material 
change in circumstances. 
An extensive search was made to find case law with similar fact patterns. However, the cases found 
doing research typically had a significant difference from this case. Those differences are as 
follows: 
• Some states do not use the substantial and material change of circumstances standard for 
modifying child support [put in cases]; 
o In some cases, the trial couti has complete discretion over when a child suppmi 
order should be modified; 
o In some cases, there is a specific percentage used to determine whether child 
support should be modified-i.e. if the child support amount sought in a 
modification differs by more than 10% up or down from the previous child support 
amount, then a modification is granted; 
• In cases where the parties had made an agreement deviating from the child support 
guidelines and a paiiy was before the court attempting to modify child support, there was 
a substantial and material change in circumstances (such as changed incomes) involved 
with the modification proceeding; 
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~ In cases where the child support order deviated from the amount of child support under 
that particular state's child support guidelines, the party appealed the original child support 
order rather than attempting a modification at a later date. 
In addition, there did not appear to be any states with a child support provision similar to Section 
5 of the Guidelines. Therefore, while a substantial amount of research was done to determine how 
other states would handle this situation, that research was not helpful in the facts of this case. 
10. An agreement of the parties to limit one party's prospective child support obligation 
is unenforceable. 
At the hearing on February 26, 2013, the trial judge granted Chris' motion to dismiss and ruled, in 
part, as follows: 
Ms. Garner has filed an action asking the Court to modify this based on child 
support calculations and demonstrating as a bootstrap argument that the application 
of all of the standards with these income numbers would show that the child support 
is adequately - or an inadequate number. It's grossly inadequate. 
And Mr. Eismann points to the child support rules as grounds for modification but 
he's missing the point. He's missing the same point that Mr. Garner missed in the 
last action and that is there is no material change in circumstance. 
This case demonstrates exactly the problems that courts have when parties show up 
in agreements where you have pro se litigants who produce numbers which are not 
consistent with child suppo11 guidelines. But in this occasion, I have written 
stipulations and agreements and it's clear from this record that Mr. Garner 
apparently at some point in this negotiation agreed on the custody arrangement that 
was made and Mrs. Gamer agreed to lesser supp011 - accepting lesser support. 
Hrg. Transcr. 9:9 - 10:3 (Feb. 26, 2013) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the trial judge found that Chris' current child support obligation is "grossly inadequate" to 
what Chris should be paying in child support. However, the trial judge refused to modify Chris' 
child support because there was no substantial and material change in circumstances and the 
district judge affirmed the trial judge's decision. 
Monica argues that the substantial and material change of circumstances standard should not apply 
to protect a child support order that significantly limits one parent's financial support of the 
children. Idaho case law has held that agreement between parents that limit one parent's financial 
support of a child are unenforceable and thereby void. It is illogical to require a party to prove a 
substantial and material change of circumstances from a child support order that is considered 
legally void. Requiring a party to prove a substantial and material change in circumstances results 
in a validation of the child support order that is legally void. 
In Keyes v. Keyes, 51 Idaho 670, 674-675, 9 P.2d 804 (1932), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
agreements limiting a party's child support obligation and stated as follows: 
Thus, the parties, by their agreement, and the court by its decree, based thereon, 
attempted to release respondent from fmiher liability for the support and 
maintenance of the minor child, except when he was in his custody, and the validity 
of that portion of such agreement and decree is thus presented for consideration. 
The general rule would seem to be that as between the husband and wife, an 
agreement touching the custody and maintenance of the children will be respected 
and enforced, yet such an agreement cannot, as against the children, divest either 
parent of the paramount duty imposed upon both by law to support and educate 
them. (Brice v. Brice, 50 Mont. 388, 147 P. 164.) As said in Karlslystv. Frazier,213 
Cal. 377, 2 P.2d 362: 
"It was beyond the power of the parties to deprive the court by their 
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private contract of its right to make such suitable provision for the support 
of their minor child as her welfare required. Lewis v. Lewis, 174 Cal. 
336, 163 P. 42; Black v. Black, 149 Cal. 224, 86 P. 505; Parkhurst v. 
Parkhurst, 118 Cal. 18, 50 P. 9; Merritt v. Merritt, 106 Cal.App. 234, 289 
P. 240; Fernandez v. Aburrea, 42 Cal.App. 131, 183 P. 366 .... In view of 
the fact that the interests of the child are a factor of prime importance, the 
court is not bound by the contract of the parties or the prayer for relief." 
To the same effect see: 9 Cal. Jur. 803, sec. 144; D'Arcy v. D'Arcy, 89 Cal.App. 
86, 264 P. 497; Wilson v. Wilson, 45 Cal. 399; 46 C. J. 1260. The duty of a father 
to supply necessaries for a child's maintenance cannot be discharged by a separation 
agreement between husband and wife. (Melson v. Melson, 151 Md. 196, 134 A. 
136.) It follows that that portion of the property settlement agreement and the 
decree relieving respondent from all further liability for the support and 
maintenance of the minor child is void as between said minor and its parents. 
From the foregoing authorities it seems conclusively established that the liability 
of a father to support his minor child cannot be abridged or limited by 
agreement of the parties, and that notwithstanding the decree provides that upon 
the transfer of certain property to the wife the husband shall be relieved of all further 
liability for the maintenance and support of a minor child, the decree may thereafter, 
in a proper proceeding, be modified to require the father to support and maintain 
such minor child. 
(emphasis added) 
The points to be drawn from Keyes, which are relevant to the issues in this case, are as follows: 
• Each parent owes a duty of maintenance and support to his or her children; 
• Such duty of maintenance and support cannot be discharged by an agreement between the 
parents; 
• An agreement between the parents in a divorce decree that relieves a parent of the duty of 
maintenance and support is void; 
• An agreement between the parents in a divorce decree that relieves a parent of the duty of 
maintenance and support is void even where there was consideration given by the parent 
attempting to avoid the duty of maintenance; 
• A divorce decree which limits or relieves a parent from the duty of maintenance and 
support is modifiable. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 89 Idaho 551, 557-558, 407 P.2d 304 (1965), the Idaho Supreme Court 
again ruled that future child support obligations cannot be limited by an agreement of the parties 
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as follows: 
With the payments she received from defendant, and any additional funds she may 
have provided from other sources, plaintiff supported the children. The past due 
obligation of defendant became an obligation to plaintiff to recompense her for the 
support of the children, otherwise provided by her. This obligation was hers to 
release for a consideration satisfactory to her. Likewise, defendant's obligation for 
alimony payments to plaintiff could be released by her for such consideration as 
she chose to accept. 
In regard to the agreement to reduce future support payments, plaintiff was likewise 
competent to bind herself, and her agreement was sufficient to support the order of 
the court modifying the decree as to such payments. However, she could not 
permanently nor conclusively release the defendant from the duty which the 
law imposes upon him as a father to provide future needed support. 
(emphasis added) 
In Anderson, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the mother's agreement to release the father from 
his past due child support obligation upon the receipt of consideration that was satisfactory to the 
mother. However, the agreement purporting to permanently release the father from future child 
support obligations is void. 
The agreement between Monica and Chris in the divorce decree that limits Chris' duty of 
maintenance and support of the parties' two children is modifiable. Chris' child support obligation 
that accrued prior to Monica's motion to modify child supp01i cannot be altered. However, Chris' 
child support obligation after the filing of Monica's motion to modify child support is modifiable. 
The trial judge's decision to dismiss Monica's motion to modify was an abuse of discretion. The 
district judge's affirmation of the trial judge's decision is reversible error. The trial judge did not 
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act consistently with the legal standards applicable to Monica's motion to modify. The trial judge 
failed to consider the effect of a legally void agreement. When the original child support order is 
void, the requirement of a permanent and substantial change in circumstances in inapplicable 
because there is no starting point to determine whether a permanent and substantial change has 
occurred. Thus, Monica was not and is not required to prove a permanent and substantial change 
in circumstances in order to modify child support in this particular scenario. 
11. The trial court's equitable powers allow the court to modify the child support. 
In Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 404-405, 690 P.2d 333 (1984), the Idaho Supreme Court 
discussed the equitable powers of courts as follows: 
Although there is the established principle of law that equity will not afford relief 
to a plaintiff where there is an adequate remedy at law, "'it is not enough that there 
is a remedy at law; it must be plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical 
and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in 
equity."' Rich v. Braxton, 158 U.S. 375,406, 15 S.Ct. 1006, 1017, 39 L.Ed. 1022 
(1895) ( citations omitted); see Am.Jur.2d Equity § 94 and cases cited therein. The 
applicability of this rule depends on the circumstances of each case. Equitable 
"[r]eliefwill be granted when in view of all the circumstances, to deny it would 
permit one of the parties to suffer a gross wrong at the hands of the other 
party, who brought about the condition." Thisted v. Country Club Tower 
Corp., 146 Mont. 87,405 P.2d 432,436 (1965), quoting Fey v. A.A. Oil Corp., 129 
Mont. 300,285 P.2d 578,587 (1955). 
Thus, the trial comi and the appellate court have the equitable power to correct a gross wrong or 
injustice to one party. 
Chris' current child support obligation of $25.00 per month results in a gross wrong and injustice 
to Monica and the parties' children. Chris is paying approximately $700.00 less per month than 
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he should be paying to support his children. Since Chris is not paying his proper share of child 
support, the burden falls to Monica to support the children financially. On February 26, 2013, the 
trial judge specifically stated in open court that Chris' child support obligation was "grossly 
inadequate." Since Chris' current child suppo1i obligation results in an injustice to Monica and to 
the parties' children, equity must intervene to provide relief if the law will not. Therefore, Monica 
should be allowed to modify child support to reflect the actual amount Chris should be paying in 
child support. 
Both the trial court and the district judge failed to address Monica's equitable claim that child 
support should be modified to correct the gross wrong and injustice to Monica and the parties' 
children. By recognizing that child support was grossly inadequate and by refusing to use the trial 
court's equitable powers to correct the child support, the trial court abused his discretion. In 
addition, the district court committed reversible error by affirming the trial court's decision without 
addressing Monica's equity theory. 
12. Monica did not file the motion to modify child support frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation as provided in I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). 
In the Motion for Attorney Fees at the trial court level, Chris requested attorney's fees on the 
dismissal of Monica's motion to modify child support under Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(1 ). On the appeal to the district court, the district court awarded attorney's fees to Chris 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121 and remanded the issue to the trial court to determine the actual 
amount to be awarded. 
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Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides as follows: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party or paiiies, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute 
which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or 
"parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, association, 
private organization, the state ofldaho or political subdivision thereof. 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides as follows: 
Rule 54(e)(l). Attorney fees. 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties 
as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract. 
Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the 
court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; but attorney 
fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, on a default 
judgment. [I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) (1999)] 
Thus, in order to be awarded attorney's fees at the trial court level and at the district court level 
pursuant to Idal10 Code § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), Chris was required to show that Monica 
brought or pursued her motion to modify child support and the subsequent appeal frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. 
In Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 250-251, 869 P.2d 554 
(1994 ), the Idaho Supreme Court stated the appellate standard ofreview of an award of attorney's 
fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) as follows: 
An award of fees under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and LC.§ 12-121, is subject to reversal 
for an abuse of discretion by the district court. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 
658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). When an exercise of discretion is involved, an appellate 
court conducts a three-step analysis: (1) whether the trial court properly perceived 
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the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether that court acted within the outer 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices; and (3) whether the comi reached its decision by the exercise 
ofreason. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). 
Thus, if the trial judge failed to act within the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to the award of attorney fees, then the award of attorney fees 
to Chris must be reversed. 
Monica presented legitimate and triable issues of fact and law, which thereby make an award of 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 improper. In McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 82 
P.3d 833, 844 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed awards of attorney's fees under Idaho 
Code§ 12-121 as follows: 
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the 
prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the comi, in its discretion, is left with 
the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
umeasonably, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. 
Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001). When deciding 
whether the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or 
without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into 
account. Id. Thus, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may 
not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted 
factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. Id. Although an award of attorney fees under the statute is 
discretionary, the award must be supported by findings, and those findings, in tum, 
must be supp01ied by the record. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 
P.3d 220 (2002). 
Thus, if Monica's motion to modify child support and subsequent appeal raised triable issues of 
fact or legitimate issues oflaw, then the trial judge and the district judge's award of attorney's fees 
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were unproper. 
Monica's motion to modify child support and the subsequent appeal were neither frivolous, 
umeasonable, nor without foundation because she raised legitimate issues of fact and law. As 
explained above, Chris' current child support obligation is "grossly inadequate" compared to what 
he should be obligated to pay under the Guidelines. The sole reason that the trial judge and the 
district judge awarded attorney fees to Chris was that Monica had failed to prove a substantial and 
material change in circumstances. 
Monica provided several legitimate legal arguments stating that the standard of a substantial and 
material change in circumstances should not apply in this case because of the unusual facts 
involved. Monica argued that the agreement between Monica and Chris that purports to limit or 
reduce Chris' child support obligation is void under Idaho law. Monica argued that because the 
agreement between Monica and Chris relating to child suppmi is void, the agreement can be 
modified as to future payments. Monica argued that Section 5 of the Guidelines does not require a 
party to prove a change in the circumstances of the parties. Monica has argued that equity should 
intervene to prevent the enforcement of an inequitable child support award. 
Monica also provided a legal and factual issue regarding Chris' gross annual income, which had 
risen by $3,462 from the time the judgment was entered on October 26, 2010. The trial judge did 
not specifically address Monica's claim regarding the increase in Chris' annual income. The 
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district judge concluded that Chris' increase in income was not substantial and material. However, 
just because the trial court and district court disagreed with Monica, that does not automatically 
make Monica's motion to modify and appeal frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
In Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 467-468, 259 P.3d 608 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court 
fmiher addressed awards of attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 as follows: 
Fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not awarded to a prevailing party as a matter ofright 
but, rather, are subject to the district court's discretion. Coward v. Hadley, 150 
Idaho 282,290,246 P.3d 391,399 (2010). A district court should only award fees 
"when it is left with the abiding belief that the action was pursued, defended, or 
brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 
Idaho 763, 769, 25 P.3d 76, 82 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, 
"when a party pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action 
is not considered to be frivolous and without foundation." Id. A claim is not 
necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a 
matter of law. Gu{f Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 
890,894,693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984). Furthermore, "[a] misperception of 
the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, unreasonable. 
Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect, 
but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 893, 950 P.2d 262, 265 
(Ct.App.1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
( emphasis added) 
Thus, Monica's motion to modify is not frivolous simply because the trial court and the district 
judge concluded that Monica's motion failed as a matter of law. The trial court and the district 
court must find that Monica's motion to modify was so plainly fallacious that it was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Monica presented legitimate triable issues of fact and law in 
her motion to modify and in her appeal. Therefore, attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 
were not appropriate at the trial court level or the district court level. 
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Idaho has not set a particular amount or percentage of increase in income that validates a 
modification of child support. In Rohr v. Rohr, 126 Idaho 1, 5-6, 878 P.2d 175 (Ct.App.1994), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals explained as follows: 
We note also that the Supreme Court, in adopting the Idaho Child Support 
Guidelines, I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6), under the authority of LC. § 32-706A, had the 
opportunity to establish a rule defining a point at which an increase in income 
would be substantial per se. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Idaho legislature 
has elected to adopt such a standard. 
Under Idaho decisional law, the determination of whether there has been a 
substantial and material change of circumstances necessitating a modification of 
child suppo1i has been left to the sound discretion of the trial court, taking into 
account the unique facts of each case. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 959, 855 
P.2d 40, 44 (1993); Levin v. Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 587, 836 P.2d 529,533 (1992). 
We think this case-by-case approach continues to be appropriate. We decline to 
specify any level where, as a matter of law, an enhanced ability to pay becomes 
a substantial change of circumstances which will trigger an increased child 
support obligation. 
( emphasis added) 
Thus, there is no ascertainable or set level at which an increase in income is considered a 
substantial and material change in circumstances to modify child support. 
Since there is no set amount or percentage at which a change in income is considered substantial 
and material, Monica's motion to modify child support required the trial judge to make a 
determination of fact and law regarding whether the change in income was substantial and 
material. Since the trial judge had to make a determination of fact and law, Monica's motion to 
modify child support was not :frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Since Monica's 
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motion to modify child support was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, the trial 
court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Chris and the district judge erred in awarding attorney's 
fees on appeal. 
13. An award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 are not appropriate on cases 
involving a matter of first impression. 
In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 121, 127, 157 P.3d 613 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated that attorney's fees are not appropriate under Idaho Code § 12-121 on matters of first 
impression and explained as follows: 
Stanion argues that he is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under LC. 
§ 12-121. That statute allows an award of "reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party .... " LC.§ 12-121. Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party 
only if "the Court determines that the action was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 
P.2d 619, 624 (1999). Ticor has not pursued this action frivolously or without 
foundation. Whether or not a title company involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding, but not as a pre-petition creditor, is a party to the proceeding for 
purposes of claim preclusion is an issue of first impression. Thus, we decline 
to award Stanion attorney fees. 
( emphasis added) 
The unique factual pattern and legal arguments presented in this case are a matter of first 
impression in Idaho and seemingly all other states. The district court's interpretation of Section 5 
of the Guidelines without citing any authority for such interpretation shows that this is a matter of 
first impression in Idaho. Thus, the district court's award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 was error. 
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Monica's case presents a significant and prevalent problem of what to do when a child support 
order is entered in violation of the Guidelines. Since this is a matter of first impression in Idaho, 
attorney's fees are inappropriate because Monica's motion to modify and her appeal to the district 
court were not frivolous, umeasonable and without foundation. Therefore, the trial court and the 
district judge committed reversible error and the award of attorney's fees at the trial court level 
and the district comi level should be reversed. 
14. The awards of attorney's fees were entered in violation of I.R.C.P. 54( e )(2). 
Chris requested attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and Idaho Code § 12-121, which were 
granted by the trial court. The district judge on appeal awarded attorney's fees to Chris pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
I.R.C.P. 54( e )(2) creates an additional requirement for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121 and provides as follows: 
Rule 54(e)(2). Findings. 
Whenever the court awards attorney fees pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, 
it shall make a written finding, either in the award or in a separate document, as to 
the basis and reasons for awarding such attorney fees. [LR. C.P. 54( e )(2) ( 1979)] 
If the awards of attorney's fees at the trial court and the district comi are not reversed on appeal, 
then those awards must be reversed and remanded for additional findings of fact and conclusions 
oflaw. In Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890, 892-893, 950 P.2d 262 (Ct.App.1997), the Idaho Court 
of Appeal addressed attorney's fees requests under Idaho Code§ 12-121 and stated as follows: 
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We must decide whether the district court's award of attorney fees to the Snipeses 
was proper. Idaho Code Section 12-121, augmented by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), 
authorizes an award of attorney fees in a civil case brought or defended frivolously, 
umeasonably or without foundation. Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 
905,910,684 P.2d 307,312 (Ct.App.1984). An award of attorney fees at trial under 
LC.§ 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e) is subject to reversal only upon a showing that the 
district court abused its discretion. US. Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Cox, 126 Idaho 733, 
735,889 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Ct.App.1995). While an award of attorney fees is within 
the unique discretion of the district court, if the record itself discloses that the claim 
or defense was not frivolously pursued, an award of attorney fees cannot be 
upheld. Black v. Young, 122 Idaho 302, 309, 834 P.2d 304, 311 (1992). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e )(2) requires the district court, when it awards 
attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121, to make written findings as to the basis and 
reasons for awarding the fees. The purpose of requiring the district court to make 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is to afford the appellate court a 
clear understanding of the district court's decision, so that it may be determined 
whether the district court applied the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching 
its conclusion. Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217,225,646 P.2d 988, 
996 (1982). The absence of adequate findings and conclusions of law will require 
a reversal of the judgment and remand for additional findings and conclusions. Id. 
Thus, an award of attorney's fees that is not accompanied by written findings as to the basis and 
reasons for awarding attorney's fees must be reversed and remanded. 
The trial judge awarded attorney's fees to Chris on the sole basis of an oral finding that Monica's 
motion for modify child support was "brought without any basis." The sole statement that a claim 
is brought without any basis does not meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) as explained in 
Snipes. The appellate courts do not have a clear understanding of the magistrate court's decision 
so that the appellate court may determine whether the magistrate court applied the proper law to 
the appropriate facts in reaching its conclusion. 
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The district judge stated at page fourteen of his memorandum decision that "the defendant clearly 
prevailed on appeal on all three of the essential issues raised. The plaintiff's case on appeal was 
fatally flawed and I conclude that there was no legal basis for any of the issues raised." Again, the 
explanation by the district judge is not sufficient to explain how or why Monica's appeal was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 
If Chris' awards of attorney's fees at the trial court and on appeal to the district court are not 
reversed in this appeal, then the issue of Chris' awards of attorney's fees should be remanded with 
instructions that findings of fact and conclusions of law must be submitted by the trial judge and 
by the district judge. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question in this case that the child support of $25.00 per child per month is grossly 
inadequate. The agreement reached between Monica and Chris was in violation of Idaho's public 
policy that parents must financially support their children. The trial court and the district judge's 
reliance on the standard of proving a substantial and material change of circumstances promotes 
and continues the violation of Idaho's public policy. Idaho's appellate courts must not allow 
agreements like the one involved in this case to stand and to continue to be enforced because a 
party cannot prove a substantial and material change of circumstances. To do so, is not in the best 
interests of the children and is a violation ofldaho's public policy. 
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Monica argues that the Guidelines, specifically Section 5, provide the legal remedy to correct the 
grossly inadequate child support order. Moreover, Monica asks that equity intervene to correct the 
grossly inadequate child support order in this case if the court finds that Section 5 of the Guidelines 
is not a legal remedy in this case. 
Lastly, Monica asks that the awards of attorney's fees at the trial court and the district court levels 
be reversed. Monica presented legitimate triable issues of fact and law on an issue of first 
impression in Idaho. Monica's motion to modify and subsequent appeal were not frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
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